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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAE SMITH,

I
Appellant,

vs.

I

Case No.

19392

DAN M. VUICICH,
Respondent.

I

Brief of Respondent Vuicich
NATURE OF CASE
This was an action by plaintiff for trespass over vacant lots and a Counterclaim by defendant for abuse of process
and for statutory attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
This case was tried before a jury of eight persons in
Third District Court, the Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.

The jury reached a verdict of no cause of action a-

gainst plaintiff, finding that defendant had not trespassed on
her property.

The jury further found in favor of defendant on

his claim for abuse of process and awarded him judgment in the
amount of $3,300.00.

Plaintiff's Motion for a Judgment Notwith-

standing the Verdict and Motion for New Trial were denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
In responding to this appeal, respondent seeks to
have this Court affirm the trial court and jury verdict.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set
forth in appellant's brief, except as to appellant's characterization of respondent's Counterclaim.

Defendant/respondent

counterclaimed against plaintiff/appellant, claiming that plaintiff had consented to defendant's crossing the subject propertv,;
that plaintiff's property was not damaged, that defendant improved plaintiff's property (by construction of a retaining wall
adding support to the slope of plaintiff's property and by
ing plaintiff's property), and that in bringing this action under those circumstances, plaintiff acted maliciously, with inten'
to defraud and committed an abuse of process.

Record 009-011.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING, FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, THE DEFENSE OF
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
Appellant has claimed for the first time on appeal
that respondent's Counterclaim does not state a cause of action
upon which relief can be granted, and that this Court should
therefore order a dismissal of the Counterclaim and the entenn;
of a judgment of no cause of action on that Counterclaim.

Ap-

pellant concedes in her brief that "the first consideration is
whether this defense may be raised at this late date."
lant's Brief at 2.

Appel-

However, appellant contends that Rule 12(hJ
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1

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits this defense to be
raised for the first time on appeal.
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
A party waives all defenses and objections
which he does not present either by motion
as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made
no motion, in his answer or reply, except
(1) that the defense of failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted ...
may also be made by a later pleading, if one
is permitted, or by motion for judgment on
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits ....
The objection or defense, if made at the trial,
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule lS(b)
in light of any evidence that may have been
received.
Appellant has not complied with any of the various alternative
methods for raising the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as against respondent's Counterclaim for abuse of process.

Counsel for plaintiff/appellant

filed a Motion to Dismiss defendant/respondent's Counterclaim,
Record at 029, but in his supporting memorandum and at argument
on that motion, he only sought dismissal of that part of defendant/respondent's Counterclaim that sounded in malicious prosecution, not abuse of process .

.!_c:!_:_ at 030-035, 037-038.

Subse-

quently, appellant never even answered respondent's Counterclaim
No defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted was raised at trial, either, as evidenced by the Record
and the lack of any Order having been entered on said issue in
accordance with Rule lS(b).

-3-

The latest possible time that Rule 12(h) permits a
party to raise the defense of "failure to state a claim", is
at trial.

The provision of Rule 12 (h) allowing the defense to

be raised by "a later pleading" does not include a Brief on Appeal, since Rule 7(a) designates the documents that are classified as "pleadings", and appellant's Brief on Appeal does no!
fall within that category.
Since the cause of action of abuse of process set
forth in respondent's Counterclaim was never challenged by appellant up and through the end of trial, and since respondent
had no notice whatsoever that appellant intended to claim that
the Counterclaim failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, appellant must be precluded from raising this defense at such a late date and for the first time on appeal.
POINT II.
RESPONDENT"S COUNTERCLAIM DID STATE A
CLAIM FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS UPON WHICH
RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED.
Appellant contends that respondent's Counterclaim was
deficient because there were "no particulars stated in the subject pleading" and because respondent did not claim that the
subject action was brought "without probable cause."
Brief at 3.

Appellant"

Notably, lack of probable cause is not an element

of an abuse of process cause of action.
Torts §121 at 856-58 (4th ed. 1971).
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W. Prosser,

The requirements of notice pleading do not mandate or
even encourage the type of pleading suggested by appellant.
Rule S(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure merely requires
a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief" although Rule 9(b) states that "in
all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
added) .

(Emphasis

It also provides that "malice, intent, knowledge, and

any other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally".

Respondent's Counterclaim conformed to those requirements,

alleging facts sufficiently encompassing all of the elements of
a cause of action for abuse of process - misuse of civil process
"for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish."
W. Prosser, supra.
Specifically, respondent's Counterclaim alleged that:

Plaintiff had consented to defendant's activities on the subject property;
Plaintiff's property was vacant and unimproved, and defendant's activities caused
no injury to said property;
The value of plaintiff's property increased
through such activity;
Defendant's independent contractors restored
and improved the subject property;
"Plaintiff has no basis for alleging that
damage lias been done to the subject I?roperty,
and has commenced this meritless action
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against defendant maliciously and with the
intent to defraud defendant";
Defendant incurred damages as a result of
plaintiff's action.
Record at 009-011.

Accordingly, respondent's Counterclaim was

entirely adequate in alleging that appellant did not have any
basis or cause for bringing the action, inasmuch as she had gi\en respondent permission to use her property, that the property
was not damaged but actually improved, and by way of general allegation, that appellant was acting maliciously and with
to defraud in bringing the action against respondent. The Counterclaim stated the necessary facts and circumstances surroundthe claim such as to provide appellant with fully adequate
notice of the nature of respondent's claim.
POINT I I I.
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FULLY SUPPORTED RESPONDENT'S CLAIM FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS, INCLUDING AN IMPROPER PURPOSE ON THE PART OF
APPELLANT.
At trial, respondent established that appellant had
initiated the subject action knowing that she did not have a
valid cause of action and therefore, the only possible purposes
for bringing such a suit would be improper, such as vexing and
harassing respondent or attempting to obtain a judgment throu{:
false testimony.
There was an abundance of testimony presented at trial
to support respondent's claim that appellant had given her
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permission for him to cross her property, and that her vacant
lots were not damaged in the least, but rather improved as a
result of respondent's activities on that property.
Defendant/respondent, Dan Vuicich testified that
plaintiff/appellant gave him and his general contractor her permission to have the pieces of construction equipment cross her
property in order to gain access to his lot.

Reporter's Partial

Trial Transcripts at 16-17 (Record at 0158-0159).

The general

contractor on the project confirmed respondent's testimony that
appellant had given her verbal authorization to cross the lots:
Ron Wilkins:

And so she told me that if
we had no other way to cross
the lot that we could do so
twice.

Q:

Did you understand that to
mean crossing whatever piece
of property you needed twice
each?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Are there any other limitations given on the permission?

A:

Not that I remember.

Q:

Did you have any doubt when
you left that you had her permission?

A:

Absolutely not.

Id. at 74-76 (Record at 0216-0218).

This evidence was supported

by additional testimony that respondent went to extraordinary
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lengths to insure compliance with appellant's authorization to
cross the property, and to make certain that a pp el lant' s vacant
lots were left in at least as good a condition as prior to the
crossing of the equipment.

For example, evidence was presented

that respondent went to extra expense to pump the cement for
the construction project over the top of his house.

Testimony

of Dan Vuicich, Id. at 27-28 (Record at 0169-0170); Testimony
of Ron Wilkins, Id. at 79 (Record at 0221).

Lumber was hauled

by hand from the street below respondent's house, and a neighbor's driveway was used for removal of the dirt from the projec:
Testimony of Ron Wilkins, Id. at 79-80 (Record at 0221-0222);
Testimony of Dan Vuicich, Id. at 27-28 (Record at 0169-0170).
Ron Wilkins, the general contractor, al so hi red the best excava·
tor available, cautioned him to take extra care, and insured
limited crossings of appellant's property.

Testimony of Ron

Wilkins, Id. at 76-77 (Record at 0218-0219).
Two neighbors, Larry Paneck, whose property adjoins
that of appellant, and Karen Holton, whose property is across
the street from that of appellant, Ron Wilkins and Dan Vuicich
all testified that appellant's property was in as good or bet·
ter condition after the crossings than it was before the equip·
ment crossed the property, and that no damage whatsoever was
done to that property.

Testimony of Larry Paneck,

35,

43, 45 (Record at 0177, 0185, 0187); Testimony of Karen Holton,
-8-

87-88, 91 (Record at 0229-0230, 0233); Testimony of Ron
Wilkins, Id. at 78-80 (Record at 0220-0222); Testimony of Dan
Vuicich, Id. at 28 (Record at 0170).

Appellant's property was

improved by respondent's activities because of the construction
of a retaining wall, as well as the extraordinary efforts of the
clean-up crew, which also rebuilt a dirt cliff on the front of
appellant's property, which had previously been damaged by
children playing in the area.

Testimony on Dan Vuicich, Id.

at 19, 28 (Record at 0161, 0170); Testimony of Ron Wilkins, Id.
at 78-79 (Record at 0220-0221).
At the time of trial, appellant was in the process of
selling her property to Robert Cushing, a realtor-contractor.
Mr. Cushing testified at trial that appellant's lot was "a perfect lot" for the house that he would be constructing, that he
was paying more for the lot than the asking price of similar lots
in the area, and that it would be necessary for him to remove
eight vertical feet of earth from a front portion of the lot in
order to construct a garage on the lot.

Testimony of Robert

Cushing, Id. at 49-50, 52-54 (Record at 0191-0192, 0194-0196).
In essence, appellant has argued that respondent should
not recover under his abuse of process claim since he produced no
direct evidence at trial that appellant brought this action for
an improper purpose.

However, the only direct evidence possible

regarding an improper purpose would be an admission of an intent
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to vex, harass or extort by plaintiff/appellant.

The lack of

such an admission does not prevent the jury from drawing reasonable inferences from the weight of the evidence presented
at trial.

In a recent opinion of this Court in a case that

was similar in many respect to the case at bar, Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), thi;
Court affirmed a jury award of compensatory damages under a
Counterclaim for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations. In doing so, this Court ruled that all

con-

flicts in the evidence from trial must be
resolved in favor of the prevailing party
and all evidence viewed and inferences
drawn in the light most supportive of the
verdict of the jury, Cintron v. Milkovich,
Utah 611 P.Zd 730, 732 (1980); Ute-Cal
Land Development Corp. v. Sather, Utah 605
P.2d 1240, 1245 (1980); Lamkin v. Lynch,
Utah 600 P. 2d 530, 531 (1979).
657 P.2d at 296-97.
Similarly, in this case, there was substantial evidence presented at trial to support the jury's inferences
that plaintiff/appellant had an improper purpose in bringing
this action, justifying a verdict in favor of respondent on hi<
Counterclaim.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's contention on appeal that respondent's
Counterclaim fails to state a cause of action upon which reliei
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can be granted, and that the Counterclaim must be dismissed,
is incorrect and improperly raised at this point in the action.

Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does

not allow such a defense to be raised for the first time on
appeal.

Even if the defense could be raised, respondent's

Counterclaim states sufficient facts and circumstances to
a claim based on abuse of process.

Finally, appellant

contends that there is insufficient evidence in the Record to
support the jury's verdict on respondent's Counterclaim for
abuse of process.

However, the references to the Record set

forth above demonstrate that there was substantial evidence
from which the jury could infer that plaintiff/appellant had
no possible justification for bringing this suit, and that her
purpose for bringing this suit was therefore improper.

Accord-

ingly, the jury's verdict on the Counterclaim and resulting
judgment must be
DATED this

7-

day of May, 1984.
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